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ELMER SKAARUP, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 01-17364
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
D.C. No. CV-99-00941-RLH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District
of Nevada Roger L. Hunt, District Judge, Presiding. Argued and
Submitted December 4, 2002--San Francisco, California Before:
John T. Noonan, Marsha S. Berzon and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit
Judges.
COUNSEL
Kirk T. Kennedy, Las Vegas, Nevada, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Robert Freeman, Las Vegas, Nevada, for the defendant-appellee.
Filed February 28, 2003
NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
Elmer ("Joe" ) Skaarup appeals from the grant
of summary judgment to the City of North Las Vegas (the City)
in his suit alleging abridgment of his right to free speech.
We hold that there are no material issues of disputed fact and
that, on the facts established, there was neither abridgment
of Skaarup's exercise of speech nor retaliation for this lawsuit.
FACTS
In early December 1997, Skaarup, then the Chief Fire
Marshall of the City, was advised that two of the five inspector
positions in his department would be eliminated by the City.
One of the two positions was held by a woman, Mary Griego. Griego
later called Skaarup in distress that she was being transferred
to Planning with what she thought was a substantial loss of salary.
Skaarup called his own superior, Fire Chief Michael Massey, to
find out what was going on. Massey told him that he "had
no idea" but "that a deal must have been struck between
IAFF 1607 [the Union] and City Management." Massey added
that the elimination of inspectors "shows the pattern of
how [Deputy City Manager Patrick] Importuna treats employees
and deals with the union."
At a staff meeting the following day, Chief Massey said
that the union would fight for Griego's job. He also told Skaarup
"that he was not surprised that the City had developed a
pattern of conduct toward female employees." Skaarup was
upset personally and upset because Dominic Gonzales, the man
transferred out of his unit, and Mary Griego were his "best
producers." Skaarup at no time spoke to the women Massey
claimed were part of this pattern about whether they felt they
had been victims of discrimination.
On December 11, 1997, Skaarup called Captain Stephanie
Wuthrich into his office and, separately, Engineer Terri Tarbett.
Neither of these employees of the City's fire department were
in his unit. Skaarup said he called them in because "I like
both of them. I wanted to find what their opinions were. What
their insight might be. And that's why I did it." As he
repeated in his deposition as to Wuthrich, "This was a private
conversation . . . I wanted to get her take on this. I wanted
to see how somebody else viewed this." The conversation
with Wuthrich lasted only a few minutes.
Skaarup told Wuthrich and Tarbett that the Union had
"sold Mary Griego down the road" and that her elimination
was an example of Deputy City Manager Importuna firing women
over forty who were single heads of households. Skaarup ascribed
this view to Fire Chief Massey and said, "Massey's right,
they' re targeting women." Running into Wuthrich in the
hall later, Skaarup talked to her in the captains' hall, where
others were present, about why government would operate this
way, referring to the transfers of both Griego and Gonzalez.
In January 1995, Wuthrich and Tarbett sent memos to Importuna
relating the substance of their conversations with Skaarup; the
women did not express an opinion on what they had heard.
On April 28, 1998, Skaarup was charged with violating
the Fire Department's Rules of Conduct, Administrative Regulations,
§ 1005. A disciplinary hearing was held on May 5, 1998,
with Skaarup and his lawyer present. On May 21, 1998, the new
Fire Chief, Robert Dodge, sustained the charges against Skaarup.
Chief Dodge found the statement about the Union making a deal
to be untrue and the statement about a discriminatory pattern
being established by Importuna to be untrue. The Chief found
both statements derogatory of City Management, "so disrespectful
of your employer as to seriously impair the maintenance of discipline,
undermine City Management and discredit the Fire Department,"
and divisive in relation to the Union. Taking into account two
previous occasions on which Skaarup had been disciplined (for
abusive speech to an employee and for setting fire to a homeless
person's camp and belongings), the Chief suspended Skaarup without
pay for eight days. Skaarup did not appeal. It is out of this
suspension that Skaarup has made a federal case.
On April 7, 1999, the City Council voted to approve
an independent audit of all the City's departments, to be conducted
by Ralph Anderson & Associates, a national consulting group.
On October 5, 1999, the consultants filed their report. It included
92 recommendations as to budget, financial management, restructuring
of several city departments, the addition and deletion of various
staff positions, and a reallocation of the resources of the Fire
Department, including the reclassification of the Fire Marshall
to Fire Inspector.
The day the report was presented, the City Council voted
to accept it and directed staff to begin to implement its recommendation.
On February 15, 2000, Skaarup was informed that the reclassification
of his position to the lower position of Fire Inspector would
be carried out.
PROCEEDINGS
On July 26, 1999, Skaarup filed this suit. On April
10, 2000, he amended his complaint to charge that the reclassification
of his position was retaliation for the suit. He alleged, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Nevada Constitution, violation
of his free speech rights; breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and "retaliatory conduct,"
without reference to any particular statute or constitution.
On June 28, 2001, Skaarup moved for partial summary
judgment on his free speech claim. On June 29, 2001, the City
moved for summary judgment on all claims. On October 9, 2001,
the district court denied Skaarup's motion and granted the City's
motion. The court applied "a balancing test" to Skarrup's
First Amendment claim. The court doubted that Skaarup's comments
were of public concern when he took no steps to make them public
knowledge. On the other side of the balancing test, the City
had a right to run an efficient fire department and Skaarup's
comments were divisive in a way that "would affect the efficient
operation and morale" of the department. The court held
there was no violation of Skaarup's right to free speech, no
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and no evidence
that the city-wide audit was a ruse to target Skaarup.
On November 8, 2001, Skaarup filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Two elements of Skaarup's free speech claim are established
beyond dispute: he incurred the adverse employment action of
eight days suspension, and he incurred it because of his speech.
See Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968,
976 (9th Cir. 2002). A portion of his speech -- that the City
was discriminating against women and particularly women over
40 -- touched on a matter of public concern. See id. Therefore,
it was appropriate for the district court to balance his right
to speak against the City's interest in effective government.
The balancing that must be undertaken to find constitutional
protection for the speech is "particularized" and depends
"upon the nature of the employee's expression." Connick
v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). "When close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities,
a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate."
Id . at 152-53.
Skaarup spoke privately to two individuals; he made
no effort either to address the allegations with his superiors
or to make them public. Compare Gilbrook v. City of Westmin
ster, 177 F. 3d 839, 867 (9th Cir. 1999) and Brewster
v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971,
981 (9th Cir. 1998). Skaarup was given the opportunity to present
to the City of North Las Vegas anything relevant to the incident
at his May 5, 1998 hearing. He presented no evidence at that
hearing that he spoke to Tarbett and Wuthrich because of their
expertise in women's issues. At the time of his suspension, the
City had had no reason to believe that he had contacted these
women because of their connection with the women firefighter's
group; that assertion, emerged only in his deposition in this
case a year and eight months later. The January 1998 memos from
Tarbett and Wuthrich to Importuna do not indicate in the slightest
that Skaarup approached them because of their interest in equal
employment issues.
Furthermore, when Skaarup made his statements, he lacked
the first-hand knowledge of the truth of the allegations. No
per se rule exists that speech to be protected must be truthful.
Johnson v. Multnomah County , 48 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir.
1995). But it is equally clear that untruthful information about
government is not helpful to the public. In this case, after
a hearing from which he did not appeal, Skaarup was found to
have made untruthful statements about the policy of the City
and about the Union representing the firefighters. While latitude
is extended to inexactitude in political discourse, the public
interest in such unsubstantiated rumors is small. At best, Skaarup
was taking sides with Fire Chief Massey in a dispute with Deputy
City Manager Importuna, in the course of which Massey seized
on the transfer of two employees, one a woman and the other a
man, to try to make the issue one of gender. The public interest
in bureaucratic infighting is also small.
On the other side of the balance was the City's interest
in not disrupting relations with the Union, the City's interest
in protecting the good name of its deputy city manager, and the
City's interest in not having its own reputation besmirched by
comments attributed to its fire chief. The City's interest was
heightened by Skaarup's relatively prominent position and his
quotation of an even higher city official, the fire chief. See
Pool v. Vanrheen , 297 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002). As
a matter of law, these interests of the City outweighed Skaarup's
right to retail the fire chief's and his own suspicions, especially
given the narrow focus and the limited audience of two to whom
Skaarup spoke. Gilbrook , 177 F.3d at 868.
The second cause of action, for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, falls with the first. The third
cause of action, for retaliation, is entirely unsupported. It
seeks to turn a city-wide reorganization, based on a study initiated
before this lawsuit, into the satisfaction of a grudge against
Skaarup. The lack of showing here is attributed to a cutoff of
discovery, but Skaarup had nearly two months to investigate the
facts before he made this baseless addition to his suit.
AFFIRMED.
BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority's opinion does not give appropriate weight
to two key facts that weigh in favor of finding Skaarup's speech
protected under the balancing test enunciated in Con nick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). First, the individuals with whom
Skaarup spoke "privately" were not just any co-workers.
They were an audience chosen because of their expertise on and
interest in issues of equal employment. Second, Skaarup was not
promulgating "unsubstantiated rumors" but was repeating
information given him by the Fire Chief, his immediate superior.
These two considerations, when properly placed on the scales,
are sufficient to tip the balance sharply in favor of constitutional
protection. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority finds it significant that Skaarup's speech
occurred in the context of private conversations with Terri Tarbett
and Stephanie Wuthrich, and that Skaarup "made no effort
to either address the allegations with his superiors or make
them public." But the law imposes no requirement that an
employee's speech on matters of public concern be aired to superiors
or publicly expressed. The First Amendment protects speech on
matters of public concern uttered in private conversations between
employees. See Givhan v. West ern Line Consolidated Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (9th Cir. 1979); Ulrich v. City and County
of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir. 2002); Nunez
v. Davis , 169 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
After hearing from Fire Chief Massey that the City and
the union had sacrificed Mary Griego's job and that Deputy City
Manager Importuna had a pattern of getting rid of women employees,
Skaarup approached Wuthrich and Tarbett to discuss the matter.
Wuthrich and Tarbett, relatively high-ranked women employees
of the Fire Department, had represented the City of North Las
Vegas Fire Department at national women firefighters' conventions.
In his deposition, Skaarup indicated that Wuthrich and Tarbett's
interest in women firefighters' issues was the reason he approached
them:
A: Captain Tarbett . . . was our representative to
the women's firefighters meeting. She had a good grasp on women's
issues in the fire service, and I wanted her opinion.
Q: Okay. So the purpose for you talking to Cap
tain Tarbett was you wanted to solicit information from her to
get her read on the situation, much like you had from Captain
Wuthrich?
A: Yes.
Q: And you said she was a representative to the
women firefighters' meeting? What is the women's firefighters
meeting?
A: I' m not altogether sure of the circumstances,
but they have a group -- like they have the black firefighters
meetings, and you have the Hispanic firefighters meetings, they
have a women's firefighters group that gets together. One year
both Terri Tarbett and Stephanie Wuthrich went to it. One year
Stephanie went to it, and I believe your last representative
was Tarbett.
Wuthrich's and Tarbett's public roles as representatives
of women firefighters made them uniquely appropriate persons
with whom to discuss allegations of gender discrimination in
the Fire Department. Skaarup recognized as much in choosing to
share the allegations of gender discrimination in the Department
with them.
The audience Skaarup chose indicates that his speech
rose above the level of mere rumor-mongering. In addressing Wuthrich
and Tarbett, Skaarup directed his statements to persons, who,
because of their publicly-demonstrated interest in the status
of women firefighters, were likely to take an interest in and
act upon allegations of gender discrimination. See Ulrich
, 308 F.3d at 979 (doctor's airing of his concerns about
layoffs at hospital staff meetings and posting a letter expressing
concerns at nurses' station "indicate that he spoke ' in
order to bring wrongdoing to light,' not ' merely to further
some purely private interest' "(quoting Havekost v. United
States Department of Navy, 925 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1991))).
In balancing the value of Skaarup's "private" speech
against the City's interest in suppressing it, the majority should
have accounted for Wuthrich's and Tarbett's involvement in women
firefighters' issues.
The majority also fails to acknowledge the significance
of the source of Skaarup's information about alleged gender discrimination
in the fire department. That source was Skaarup's immediate superior,
Fire Chief Massey. As the current Fire Chief, Massey was surely
a credible source of information about City Hall actions affecting
the department. So, although Skaarup may have lacked first-hand
knowledge of the existence of gender discrimination in the Fire
Department, he had little reason to doubt the information relayed
to him. Skaarup could legitimately believe that Massey's theories
about deal-cutting and discrimination at City Hall were substantiated,
especially when Massey could name several women who had been
recently dismissed or driven out of City employment.
Although the majority does not question the determination
made at Skaarup's disciplinary hearing that his statements were
untruthful, the City presented no evidence in the hearing or
in the record before us that the allegations of gender discrimination
made by Massey and disseminated by Skaarup were in fact untrue.
The disciplinary hearing determination that Skaarup's statements
were untruthful was presented in an entirely conclusory manner,
without elucidation of factual support for the judgment that
Skaarup had spoken untruthfully.
Even if the information relayed by Skaarup was untruthful,
under our decision in Johnson v. Multnomah County , 48
F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1995), the truthfulness of an employee's statements
must be weighed as only one of several factors in balancing that
employee's interest in speech against the employer's interests
in maintaining office discipline. Johnson dictates
that recklessly-made false statements must be considered in light
of the actual damage done by the dissemination of untruthful
information. Id. at 424.
The City has made no showing that anyone believed Skaarup's
statements. In fact, record evidence shows that Tarbett and Wuthrich
openly expressed their disagreement with Skaarup's statement
that the union had made a deal with the city and "sold Mary
Griego down the road." Moreover, the City and the union
could have easily rebutted Skaarup's statements by taking action
to clarify why Griego was transferred, or by issuing actual facts
to refute charges of discrimination, such as publicizing in a
memorandum the actual numbers of women in the Fire Department
or City workforce. The record does not indicate that the City
took any action to dispel the damage allegedly caused by Skaarup's
speech.
Although City officials assert that Skaarup's statements
were "inflammatory and devisive [sic] in their nature and
each separately posed a real threat to working harmony within
the Fire Department," the City provides no evidence that
Skaarup's speech actually generated divisiveness or dis ruption.
See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995) (government
must show "real, not imagined disruption" caused by
employee speech; assertion of close working relationships cannot
serve as "a pretext for stifling legitimate speech or penalizing
public employees for expressing unpopular views" ). Further,
if there were any disruption caused by Skaarup's speech, the
disruption was traceable to misinformation provided by his immediate
supervisor.
It appears, indeed, that internal disharmony -- between
the Fire Chief and the Deputy City Manager -- already existed.
In essence, Skaarup was discharged for choosing to side with
one faction rather than the other in a higher-level power struggle,
not for himself creating dissonant working rela tionships
within the Fire Department. Under these circumstances, the City's
purported "interest in promoting harmony among co-workers"
can become a euphemism for an interest in imposing uniformity
of thought and opinion among its employees citywide. That interest
is one that is at odds with the values underlying the First Amendment
and weighs for rather than against constitutional protection
for the offending speech.
The City has therefore not met its burden to demonstrate
that concrete management interests outweighed Skaarup's First
Amendment interest in discussing possible gender discrimination
in the Fire Department. See Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d
775, 784 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Once a plaintiff shows that his
statements were of public concern and that the statements were
a substantial motivating factor for the disciplinary action taken
against him, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
its legitimate administrative interests outweigh the plaintiff's
First Amendment rights." )
In sum, the majority minimizes critical facts that augment
the First Amendment value of Skaarup's speech and weaken the
City's allegations of disruption caused by the speech. Once these
facts are weighed, the balance tips in favor of protecting Skaarup's
speech. Because the majority failed to consider all relevant
facts and accord them due weight in balancing employer interests
in discipline and harmony against employee interests in speech
on matters of public concern, I respectfully dissent.
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